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INTRODUCTION 
In New Orleans, a cursory examination of the city’s 
neighborhoods and surrounding areas tells the story. Lime green 
dots shade almost the entirety of Central City, Algiers, Gentilly, 
New Orleans East, and the Lower Ninth Ward.1 Conversely, blue 
dots predominate in Uptown, Algiers Point, Lakeview, Metairie, 
the Garden District, and the French Quarter.2 In Detroit, 8 Mile 
Road forms the line of demarcation, blue dots blanketing north of 
the road and green dots covering the south.3 Atlanta, Birmingham, 
Chicago, and St. Louis present similar pictures.4 The colored dots 
reflect data from the 2010 Census: one dot for every individual; 
green represents blacks, and blue represents whites.5 The images 
described come from “the most comprehensive map of race in 
America ever created.”6 The map—particularly the close-ups of 
individual cities—shows conclusively that racial segregation 
continues to plague this country’s residential communities.7 
Although a few cities such as New York, San Francisco, and Los 
Angeles have more integrated neighborhoods, racial segregation 
proves to be the norm.8  
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by CORNELIUS J. MURRAY IV. 
 1. Dustin A. Cable, The Racial Dot Map, WELDON COOPER CTR. FOR PUB. 
SERV., UNIV. OF VA., http://demographics.coopercenter.org/DotMap/index.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7MEA-7WUH. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. Further, red represents Asians, orange represents Hispanics, and 
brown represents all others. Id. 
 6. Kyle Vanhemert, The Best Map Ever Made of America’s Racial 
Segregation, WIRED (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/design 
/2013/08/how-segregated-is-your-city-this-eye-opening-map-shows-you/?viewall 
=true, archived at http://perma.cc/X6XX-CWG3 (presenting the work of Dustin 
Cable, a statistician at the University of Virginia). 
 7. See Cable, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
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Almost 50 years ago, the passage of the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) provided a potential solution to the segregation of 
American neighborhoods.9 A primary purpose of the FHA, “which 
was passed as an immediate response to Dr. King’s assassination, 
was to replace the ghettos with ‘truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns.’”10 Congress believed that the FHA’s ban on 
discriminatory housing practices would lead to more integrated 
communities.11 However, as scholars have noted and census data 
indicates, truly integrated communities have not emerged.12 
Despite the passage of the FHA, one of the primary causes of 
America’s segregated communities continues to be housing 
discrimination.13 “Each year, tens of thousands of FHA complaints 
are filed, and these complaints represent ‘only a fraction of 
instances of housing discrimination’ that actually occur annually, 
which is estimated to be about 4,000,000.”14  
One tool for fighting housing discrimination, in addition to the 
well-established disparate treatment doctrine,15 is disparate impact 
theory.16 As opposed to disparate treatment, which only targets 
practices motivated by discriminatory intent, disparate impact 
focuses on practices that have discriminatory effects on protected 
classes of people. Legal scholars disagree on the ultimate purpose 
of the disparate impact theory; some claim that it is meant solely to 
                                                                                                             
 9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012). 
 10. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated 
Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s 
“Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 125 (2012) (quoting 114 
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)).  
 11. See 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968). Senator Mondale stated that the goal 
of the FHA was to replace the ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns.” Id. 
 12. Schwemm, supra note 10, at 125, 132–33 (noting that American 
Apartheid, a 1990s commentary on segregation in this country, recognized that 
racial segregation is “the principal organizational feature of American society” 
and that the 2010 census data indicates that “the United States is still a 
residentially segregated society”).  
 13. Id. at 134 (“Another cause of segregation is housing discrimination 
against racial minorities . . . .”); Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, 
Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 65 (1998) 
(“African Americans found themselves limited to de facto segregated 
geographies by public and private discrimination.”). 
 14. Schwemm, supra note 10, at 134–35 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR 
HOUSING 2 (2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2008 
annual-rpt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4GG4-XVBX).  
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
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provide for inadvertent, effects-based liability,17 while others argue 
that it is designed to smoke out well-disguised unlawful intent,18 
but the practical reality is that it can be used to fight effectively 
against both.19 Over the past 40 years, though, FHA plaintiffs have 
had little success with disparate impact claims.20 Scholars have 
attributed the theory’s failure to the lack of a clear standard,21 
which is the result of a circuit split over the proper analysis,22 as 
well as the theory’s use as a “Plan B” to disparate treatment 
claims,23 which very well could be the consequence of disparate 
impact’s illusory analytical framework. Either way, disparate 
impact’s failure has contributed to the persistence of housing 
discrimination, and far too many instances go unchallenged.24  
Rather than looking to resolve the circuit split over the proper 
standard, the Supreme Court appears destined to read disparate 
                                                                                                             
 17. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with 
Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Anti-Discrimination Law, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1198 (2007) [hereinafter Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to 
Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?]. 
 18. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective 
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987). 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An 
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 393 (2013) [hereinafter Seicshnaydre, Is 
Disparate Impact Having Any Impact?] (“What is abundantly clear when 
analyzing the FHA disparate impact case law over the past forty years is that the 
appellate courts have had little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate 
impact claims under the FHA. . . . [P]laintiffs have received positive decisions in 
less than 20%, or eighteen of the ninety-two FHA disparate impact claims 
considered on appeal.”). 
 21. Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward A Coherent Test for Disparate Impact 
Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 774–75 (2009) (claiming that a lack of 
coherency involving disparate impact standards in both the employment and fair 
housing contexts likely factors into a potential plaintiff’s decision whether to 
bring suit). See also Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact in 
Fair Housing Act Claims: Landlord Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher 
Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1991 (2010) (explaining that a lack of 
clarity regarding the discriminatory effects test has raised questions of how and 
when to use an FHA disparate impact analysis in the context of Section 8 
voucher discrimination claims).  
 22. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 23. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good 
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1148–49; Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact 
Having Any Impact?, supra note 20, at 393.  
 24. See supra note 14. 
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impact theory out of the FHA.25 The Court first signaled the 
theory’s eventual demise with its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, an 
employment discrimination case.26 Moreover, the Court’s recent 
desire to address the viability of disparate impact under the FHA,27 
despite no circuit split on that issue,28 further indicates that the 
theory’s days are likely numbered.29 With this in mind, fair 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Stephanie Sheeley, Settlement in Mount Holly, New Jersey, THE 
FHACTS: THE FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER BLOG (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://www.gnofairhousing.org/2013/11/25/settlement-in-mount-holly-new-jersey/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/F3KQ-9DZW (“Many commentators speculated that 
today’s conservative-leaning Supreme Court would have decided the question in a 
way that contravened all of the other courts to have ever ruled on the issue and 
similarly contravened established, previously uncontroversial principles of law.”); 
see infra Part I.E.  
 26. 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (remarking that this 
decision “merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to 
confront the question” of whether disparate impact theory violates the Equal 
Protection Clause). See infra Part II.A.1. 
 27. Since 2011, the Court has granted certiorari in three cases presenting the 
issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. See 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 
275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court 
orders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. Oct. 
2, 2014) (No. 13-1371); Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in 
Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012). 
 28. All 11 circuits that have considered whether the FHA includes a 
disparate-impact standard have found in the affirmative. Implementation of the 
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 
11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). See 2922 Sherman 
Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002); Reg’l Econ. 
Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 
2002); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 
F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. 
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 
1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 
790 (6th Cir. 1996); East-Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 
563 (7th Cir. 2005); Keller v. City of Freemont, 719 F.3d 931, 948 (8th Cir. 
2013); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 
1996); Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1217 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 29. The Court reverses roughly two-thirds of the cases on which it grants 
certiorari, indicating, in this case, a potential desire to overturn the near-unanimous 
approval of an FHA disparate-impact standard by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. See 
Stephen J. Wermiel, Supreme Court Reversals: Exploring the Seventh Circuit, 32 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 641, 643–44 (2008) (noting that from 2001 through 2006 the Court’s 
reversal rate has been at a “consistent high of 70% or above”); see also Circuit 
Scorecard: October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), http://scotus 
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/scorecards_OT12.pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/ZF6P-6NTB (showing a 72% overall reversal rate for October Term 
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housing advocates have worked to keep the theory afloat by 
pushing for out-of-court settlements before the Supreme Court can 
speak on the issue.30 In 2013, the Court granted certiorari in 
Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey v. Mount Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action to decide whether the FHA supports disparate 
impact claims.31 Yet, a month before the case was set for oral 
argument, the parties settled and kept the Court from addressing 
the disparate impact issue.32 Similarly, an out-of-court settlement 
ended the Court’s first attempt to address disparate impact under 
the FHA in the 2011 case of Gallagher v. Magner.33 Although 
settling cases out from under the Court has temporarily avoided the 
Court’s seemingly inevitable rejection of FHA disparate impact 
claims,34 this issue is far from resolved.  
In the 2014–2015 Term, the Court picked up the issue once 
again in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.35 And while the ultimate 
outcome of Inclusive Communities is still unknown, only two 
results appear likely: Civil rights advocates will succeed in pushing 
for another settlement, or the Court will finally strike down 
disparate impact under the FHA. Either way, Congress must act to 
permanently guarantee the use of disparate impact theory in fair 
                                                                                                             
 
2012); Circuit Scorecard: October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2012), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_scorecard_OT11 
_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/492Q-2QJ9 (showing a 63% overall reversal 
rate for October Term 2011).  
 30. See Greg Stohr, Landmark Housing Law Challenged in High Court Bias 
Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2014-10-02/texas-housing-bias-case-gets-u-s-supreme-court-review.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/73CN-UMEP; Adam Liptak, Fair-Housing Case Is Settled Before 
It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reaches-supreme-court.html?_r=0, 
archived at http: //perma.cc/QVG3-XKEM. 
 31. 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013).  
 32. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mount Holly Settlement Update, JDSUPRA BUSINESS 
ADVISOR (Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/mount 
-holly-settlement-update-34745/, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZV9-YVPR.  
 33. Lyle Denniston, Fair Housing Case Dismissed, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 10, 
2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/fair-housing-case-dismissed, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YG65-9M7F; Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012).  
 34. See infra Part II.A.  
 35. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders 
/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. 
Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371). 
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housing by amending the FHA to explicitly include a disparate 
impact cause of action.  
This Comment proposes a congressional response to the 
outcome in Inclusive Communities (whether by way of settlement 
or Supreme Court opinion) that will statutorily guarantee disparate 
impact claims within the Fair Housing Act, while also providing a 
statutorily-mandated “modified burden-shifting” standard for the 
clear, uniform, and effective adjudication of such claims. The FHA 
must continue to provide plaintiffs with the ability to raise 
disparate impact claims to effectively combat housing 
discrimination and facilitate an integrated society. Further, FHA 
disparate impact claims require a new, uniform standard for courts 
to apply with a structure reflecting the Act’s purpose so that 
instances of discrimination decline and the majority of those that 
do occur do not continue to go unchallenged.36 
The first Part of this Comment defines the disparate impact 
theory, explains the difference between it and disparate treatment, 
and traces its history from the employment context to fair housing 
law. Part II then addresses the current state of the theory under the 
FHA and proposes a congressional amendment that will guarantee 
a future for disparate impact claims under the FHA. After 
acknowledging that disparate impact in its current form is not 
perfect, Part III identifies the current deficiencies within the FHA 
disparate impact framework and proposes a solution: a modified 
burden-shifting standard. It then highlights the strength of this 
approach over other potential methods for rectifying the issues 
with disparate impact in the fair housing context and explains how 
the new standard can be incorporated into an amendment to the 
FHA. The pervasive racial segregation within today’s American 
communities—nearly half of a century after the passage of the 
FHA—is unacceptable. This Comment proposes a solution to the 
issues and uncertainty surrounding disparate impact under the 
FHA, and in doing so, aims to provide potential litigants with a 
tool for eradicating the discriminatory housing practices that 
further residential segregation.  
I. DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY: WHAT IT IS AND WHERE IT CAME 
FROM 
The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap in the 
sale, rental, or financing of housing.37 It also makes unlawful any 
                                                                                                             
 36. See supra note 14.  
 37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3607 (2012). 
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other practices that deny housing, or make housing unavailable, on 
the basis of an individual’s membership in any of the these 
protected classes.38 Plaintiffs in FHA cases have two primary 
avenues through which to obtain relief: disparate treatment and 
disparate impact.39 
A. Disparate Treatment 
Under the FHA, disparate treatment refers to housing practices 
that intentionally treat similarly situated persons differently.40 In 
other words, a practice qualifies as disparate treatment if it applies 
rules to a protected set of people that are different from the rules 
that it applies to others.41 Take for instance a real estate agent who 
meets with two prospective tenants that have responded to an 
advertisement for a rental property.42 One of the prospective 
tenants is white and the other is black.43 The agent tells the white 
prospective tenant that the rental unit is a one-bedroom home 
available at $700 per month and that a deposit and first month’s 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id.  
 39. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human 
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 381 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring) 
(“We have previously held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of the FHA 
by showing that the defendant has an intent to discriminate (‘disparate 
treatment’) or that an otherwise neutral practice has a disparate impact on a 
protected class (‘disparate impact’).”); Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 
1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Discrimination may occur either by disparate 
treatment or disparate impact.”).  
 40. Reinhart, 482 F.3d at 1229 (“A disparate-treatment claim requires proof 
of ‘differential treatment of similarly situated persons or groups;’ the 
discrimination must be intentional.” (citations omitted)). 
 41. Sharpvisions, Inc. v. Borough of Plum, 475 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (W.D. 
Pa. 2007) (“Disparate treatment, under the FHA, may be shown by 
‘demonstrating that a given legislative provision discriminates against the 
handicapped on its face, i.e. applies different rules to the disabled than are 
applied to others.’” (quoting Arc of N.J., Inc. v. New Jersey, 950 F. Supp. 637, 
643 (D.N.J. 1996))).  
 42. This hypothetical is based on the facts of Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 
1043 (9th Cir. 1999). For the purposes of this hypothetical, the facts were 
changed slightly to more clearly demonstrate the disparate treatment theory. In 
Harris, the real estate agent spoke to the prospective tenants over the phone 
when making the discriminatory statements. Id. at 1053. Although some may 
argue that racial discrimination is not possible via phone conversation because 
the alleged offender cannot actually see the other person’s race, courts have held 
otherwise. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(describing telephone tests of landlord compliance with the FHA as evidence of 
housing discrimination); Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that punitive damages are available in a case involving a telephone 
test). 
 43. See Harris, 183 F.3d at 1048. 
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rent will be needed to secure the home.44 Then, while speaking to 
the black individual, the agent describes the rental as a small unit 
in a bad neighborhood.45 The agent tells the black prospective 
tenant that he or she will have to contact the owner about the terms 
of the rental and that the cost of the unit may increase depending 
on how many people will occupy it.46 This real estate agent has 
violated the FHA by intentionally treating the individuals 
differently based on their race, and the black individual would 
have a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA.47  
B. Disparate Impact 
On the other hand, disparate impact refers to practices that, on 
their face, appear non-discriminatory but actually, or predictably, 
lead to a disproportionate effect on members of a protected class.48 
Take, for example, a lending institution that offers loans to 
homeowners and prospective homeowners in urban areas.49 That 
institution, however, has a policy that it only makes loans to 
individuals whose homes (or prospective homes) have values 
greater than $100,000.50 In the urban areas in which the lender 
operates, though, the vast majority of homeowners whose 
properties are valued at less than $100,000 are black and 
Hispanic.51 Accordingly, the vast majority of available homes at 
less than $100,000 lie in predominantly black and Hispanic 
neighborhoods, meaning that black and Hispanic individuals are 
more likely to try to acquire funding for homes in those areas.52 
Under this program, the lender denies a significant majority of loan 
applications for funding of homes in predominantly black and 
Hispanic neighborhoods, and thus black and Hispanic homeowners 
and prospective homeowners are denied loans at a significantly 
                                                                                                             
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 1053–54.  
 48. Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A 
disparate-impact claim, on the other hand, challenges a facially neutral policy 
that ‘actually or predictably results in . . . discrimination.’” (quoting Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
 49. See generally Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Home 
Lenders Holding Co., 573 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 50. Complaint at 2, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Home 
Lenders Holding Co., 573 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-01357-
EGS). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
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higher rate than white applicants.53 The lender’s policy, although 
facially neutral, has a disproportionate effect on minority 
individuals.54 Consequently, the lender’s practice could be deemed 
a violation of the FHA under the disparate impact theory.55  
However, disparate impact did not originate in the fair housing 
context. Rather, it emerged in the world of employment law and 
courts then extended it by analogy to the FHA.56 The theory’s 
development, though, has been marked with controversy and 
confusion.57 
C. The Origins of Disparate Impact in Employment Law 
From the inception of the Civil Rights Acts, courts and 
scholars alike recognized that liability for practices with a 
discriminatory effect was integral to effective enforcement of the 
Acts.58 Seniority and testing systems used by employers for 
promotions and hiring decisions provided the impetus for this 
discovery.59 Two cases in particular laid the groundwork for the 
development of disparate impact theory in employment law.60  
1. Early Inklings of Disparate Impact 
In 1968, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., equated the 
                                                                                                             
 53. See id.  
 54. See Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
 57. See infra Part III; Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved 
with Good Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1141 (“[T]he theory remains 
misunderstood, mislabeled, and misused.”).  
 58. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519 (E.D. Va. 
1968); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 983 (5th 
Cir. 1969); George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under 
Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring 
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969); Note, Title VII, Seniority 
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967) 
[hereinafter Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent 
Negro]. 
 59. Seniority systems refer to promotion policies used by employers that 
rely on the amount of time an employee has worked in a certain department, 
while testing systems refer to hiring policies used by employers that require 
prospective employees to pass certain intelligence tests in order to be considered 
for employment. See Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 512–13; United Papermakers, 
416 F.2d at 983; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). 
 60. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 701, 712 (2006). 
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use of seniority systems with a discriminatory effect to intentional 
discrimination.61 The court stated “that the defendants . . . 
intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices by 
discriminating on the ground of race against [the plaintiff], and 
other Negroes similarly situated. This discrimination, embedded in 
seniority and transfer provisions of collective bargaining 
agreements, adversely affect[ed] the conditions of employment and 
opportunities for advancement of the class.”62 Just a year later, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed this 
concept more fully. 
In Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the discriminatory effect of an employer’s 
seniority system used for making promotion decisions.63 The 
system awarded promotions to what were “whites-only” jobs on 
the basis of seniority attained in other formerly “whites-only” jobs, 
in effect barring African-American employees from receiving such 
promotions.64 The court concluded that “[w]hen an employer 
adopts a system that necessarily carries forward the incidents of 
discrimination into the present, his practice constitutes on-going 
discrimination, unless the incidents are limited to those that safety 
and efficiency require.”65 Despite the practice being facially 
neutral, the court determined that it had a discriminatory effect 
relating back to the days of lawful employment discrimination, 
thus violating Title VII.66 With this recognition, the Fifth Circuit 
took an early step towards establishing disparate impact theory.67 
However, the Supreme Court did not officially sanction the use of 
effects-based liability under Title VII until two years after United 
Papermakers.68  
                                                                                                             
 61. Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 519. 
 62. Id. (emphasis added).  
 63. United Papermakers, 416 F.2d at 983. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 994.  
 66. Id. at 997.  
 67. Academics also played a significant role in this historic decision. Selmi, 
supra note 60, at 712. In fact, the court in United Papermakers relied heavily on 
two articles published in the Harvard Law Review. In 1969, two well-known 
legal scholars argued that employers’ use of test scores and seniority to make 
hiring and promotion decisions was unlawful discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See generally Cooper & Sobol, supra note 58. 
Similarly, student commentators contended in another article that facially 
neutral seniority systems have a discriminatory effect on African-Americans and 
that Title VII should provide a remedy. See generally Note, Title VII, Seniority 
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, supra note 58. 
 68. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
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2. Supreme Court Approval of Disparate Impact 
In 1971, the Supreme Court approved disparate impact liability 
with its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.69 In Griggs, 
African-American plaintiffs challenged Duke Power Company’s 
requirement that employees have a high school education and pass 
an intelligence test to obtain employment in any department other 
than labor.70 Reversing the district and appellate court decisions, 
which held for the employer on the grounds that there was “no 
showing of discriminatory purpose,”71 the Supreme Court found 
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”72 
The Court further stated that “Congress directed the thrust of the 
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the 
motivation.”73  
With this interpretation of Title VII, the Supreme Court 
established the disparate impact theory and opened up employers 
to greater Title VII liability.74 Yet, the Court chose to narrowly 
tailor its holding by stating that “[i]f an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related 
to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”75 Consequently, 
disparate impact claims only survived if the employer’s practice 
proved unrelated to the job in question.76 Although the Griggs 
decision now stands out as a landmark in civil rights law, 
practically speaking, it provided little interruption to the status quo 
of the time because courts readily accepted employers’ 
justifications for their discriminatory employment practices.77 This 
trend continued: “By the end of the theory’s first decade, the Court 
had rejected more challenges than it had accepted . . . . A theory 
that burst onto the scene in 1971 ended its first decade with a 
whimper . . . [and] the two ensuing decades simply confirmed the 
theory’s limited reach . . . .”78  
The Court’s next key disparate impact decision was Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, where the Supreme Court lessened the 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 427.  
 71. Id. at 428.  
 72. Id. at 431. 
 73. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).  
 74. Selmi, supra note 60, at 708.  
 75. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).  
 76. Selmi, supra note 60, at 721.  
 77. Id. at 724.  
 78. Id. at 733–34. 
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employer’s burden even further.79 The Court held that employers 
“need not show that their job qualifications were justified by 
business necessity in the strictest sense.”80 Rather, the Court 
concluded that “the dispositive issue is whether a challenged 
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment 
goals of the employer.”81 In addition to the weak substantive 
interpretation of business necessity, the Court also placed the 
procedural burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to disprove 
business necessity.82 The Court’s decision emphatically reaffirmed 
the employer-friendly nature of the disparate impact standard.  
After Wards Cove, the standard for analyzing Title VII 
disparate impact claims placed the initial burden on the employee 
to make out a prima facie case.83 The employer could then justify 
its practice by showing that it significantly served a legitimate 
employment goal, but the employer bore only the burden of 
production, not the burden of persuasion.84 The employee could 
only overcome the employer’s justification by persuading the fact-
finder that less-discriminatory alternatives existed.85 Critics of 
Wards Cove believed that the Court’s interpretation of the 
disparate impact standard undermined the theory’s effectiveness.86  
With Wards Cove and other Supreme Court judgments 
“threaten[ing] to eviscerate the Griggs decision,”87 Congress 
responded by amending Title VII to codify the disparate impact 
theory and the appropriate burdens of proof in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.88 With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress narrowed 
the definition of business necessity,89 and clearly put the burden of 
persuasion on the employer to prove business necessity.90 However, 
                                                                                                             
 79. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also 
Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the 
Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
1479, 1483 (1996). 
 80. Spiropoulos, supra note 79, at 1501; Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. 
at 659 (“[T]here is no requirement that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or 
‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business . . . .”). 
 81. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 657.  
 84. Id. at 659. 
 85. Id. at 659–60.  
 86. Spiropoulos, supra note 79, at 1503–04. 
 87. Selmi, supra note 60, at 703. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 89. However, the amendment’s definition of business necessity is quite 
ambiguous, stating that to present a viable defense the employer must demonstrate 
that “the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.” Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 90. Id.  
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a precise definition of “business necessity” continues to elude 
courts.91  
D. The Development of Disparate Impact in the Fair Housing 
Context 
Just a year after the Court’s decision in Griggs, it took on 
another civil rights case that would significantly influence the 
development of disparate impact theory. This time, though, the 
case arose under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968—the 
Fair Housing Act.92 In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., the Supreme Court relied on Title VII jurisprudence to 
interpret the FHA, setting an important precedent.93 The case arose 
when two tenants of a San Francisco apartment complex filed suit 
against their landlord under the FHA for discrimination against 
nonwhites in the rental process.94 Both the district court and the 
court of appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because 
they were not the focus of the discriminatory housing practice.95 
However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the 
grounds that Congress intended standing under the FHA, like 
standing under Title VII, to extend “as broadly as is permitted by 
Article III of the Constitution.”96 The ultimate takeaways from 
Trafficante are that the FHA’s language is “broad and inclusive”— 
a phrase that courts still cite today—and that courts should 
interpret the Act analogously to Title VII.97 
However, analogies to Title VII’s disparate impact theory did 
not begin to take hold until 1974. In that year, for the first time, a 
federal appellate court found a violation of the FHA based on 
discriminatory effects.98 In United States v. City of Black Jack, 
Missouri, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the city of Black 
Jack’s zoning ordinance, which prohibited the construction of any 
                                                                                                             
 91. See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 239–42 (3d Cir. 
2007).  
 92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012).  
 93. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).  
 94. The plaintiffs alleged that the complex’s discrimination against nonwhites 
in the rental process injured them by depriving them of the social benefits of living 
in an integrated community, by depriving them of business and professional 
advantages, and by causing embarrassment and stigmatization as residents of a 
“white ghetto.” Id. at 207–08. 
 95. Id. at 208.  
 96. Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 
(3d Cir. 1971)). 
 97. Id.  
 98. See generally United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th 
Cir. 1974). 
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new multiple-family dwellings, violated the FHA.99 Specifically, the 
court examined whether the ordinance “operated to preclude 
construction of a low to moderate income integrated townhouse 
development known as Park View Heights,” which was designed to 
provide “alternative housing opportunities for persons of low and 
moderate income living in the ghetto areas of St. Louis.”100 The 
United States alleged in its complaint that the ordinance violated the 
FHA by denying persons housing on the basis of race and by 
interfering with individuals’ rights to equal housing opportunities.101 
In its analysis, the court clarified how a plaintiff can make a prima 
facie case under the FHA by stating that the plaintiff must simply 
show that the defendant’s actions actually or predictably result in a 
discriminatory effect.102 With this statement and its final judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs,103 the Eighth Circuit paved the way for 
disparate impact to enter the fair housing world. 
II. DISPARATE IMPACT TODAY: A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE 
THEORY’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE UNDER THE FHA 
Since the Black Jack decision, 40 years of litigation have 
supported the belief that the FHA includes a disparate impact 
standard.104 All 11 circuits that have considered the issue have 
found accordingly.105 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the 
issue,106 but the Court appears destined to eliminate disparate 
impact theory from fair housing law.107 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. at 1181. 
 100. Id. at 1181–82. At the time, African-Americans comprised approximately 
two-thirds of St. Louis’s population. Id. at 1183. Conversely, African-Americans 
comprised only one to two percent of Black Jack’s population. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1181. 
 102. Id. at 1184. 
 103. Id. at 1187–88. 
 104. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, 
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 3 
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DIS 
PARATE%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/N5L8-FGWM. 
 105. See supra note 28. 
 106. See 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 
F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has yet to consider the 
availability of disparate impact claims under the FHA.”); SCHWEMM & PRATT, 
supra note 104, at 4. 
 107. See infra Part II.A. 
228 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
A. The Current State of Disparate Impact Under the FHA 
The Court in recent years has issued opinions dealing with 
disparate impact claims under other civil rights statutes, specifying 
that each statute’s coverage of such claims must be determined on 
the basis of that statute’s particular text and purposes.108 However, 
one recent case signaled even greater concerns for the future of the 
disparate impact theory as a whole. 
1. A Sign of Things to Come: Ricci v. DeStefano 
In 2009, the Supreme Court addressed the perceived clash of 
disparate impact and disparate treatment and how that clash may 
reveal constitutional concerns.109 In Ricci v. DeStefano, white and 
Hispanic firefighters sued the city of New Haven, Connecticut, for 
refusing to certify the results of a promotional exam.110 The exam, 
taken by 118 New Haven firefighters for the chance at a promotion 
to the rank of lieutenant or captain, resulted in white firefighters 
outperforming minority firefighters.111 In response, the mayor and 
other politicians opened up a public debate about the test results 
that quickly turned hostile.112 Some firefighters argued that the test 
was discriminatory and that the results should be thrown out, while 
others demanded that the results be used for making promotions 
because the test was fair and neutral.113 Both sides threatened 
lawsuits.114 Ultimately, the city threw the results out because it 
feared that, if followed, the results would have a disparate impact on 
minority firefighters.115 The white and Hispanic firefighters who 
would have received promotions responded by filing suit under Title 
VII, alleging that the city’s decision not to use the results for making 
promotions constituted intentional discrimination.116 The Supreme 
Court agreed, holding that an employer must have a “strong basis in 
evidence” for believing it will be subject to disparate impact liability 
before it can engage in intentional discrimination.117 
                                                                                                             
 108. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,463 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 100). 
 109. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 110. Id. at 557. 
 111. Id. at 562. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 563. 
 116. Id. at 562–63.  
 117. Id. at 585. The Court in Ricci held that fear of litigation alone was 
insufficient to form a strong basis in evidence that an employer would be subject 
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In concurrence, Justice Scalia remarked that the majority simply 
“postpon[ed] the evil day” when the Court will have to answer 
whether disparate impact is consistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution.118 Without directly stating his take on 
the constitutional issue, Scalia indicated that the theory’s days may 
be numbered. However, the Court’s preference to avoid 
constitutional questions when possible,119 in conjunction with the 
fact that the FHA’s language does not explicitly include disparate 
impact claims,120 indicates that the Court will likely address the 
viability of FHA disparate impact on statutory grounds. In other 
words, the Court can dispose of this question by simply stating that 
the FHA’s language does not support a disparate impact cause of 
action, which will allow it to answer the FHA disparate impact 
question without triggering far-reaching consequences within 
Equal Protection doctrine. Indeed, the Court’s approach in three 
recent FHA disparate impact cases shows that this Court will likely 
strike down disparate impact claims under the FHA—if it gets the 
chance to do so.121  
2. An Opportunity Lost: Magner v. Gallagher 
In 2011, the Supreme Court for the first time accepted an 
opportunity to review the applicability of disparate impact under the 
FHA in the case of Magner v. Gallagher.122 The case arose when 
landlords in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, filed suit against the city 
                                                                                                             
 
to disparate impact liability, id. at 592, but the standard’s precise nature is not 
altogether clear as Ricci was the first case in which the Court used the “strong 
basis in evidence” language outside of the Equal Protection context. See Herman 
N. Johnson, Jr., The Evolving Strong-Basis-In-Evidence Standard, 32 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 349 (2011). However, Professor Herman N. Johnson, Jr., 
has persuasively argued that the Court’s relocation of the standard to Title VII 
doctrine marks the transformation of “strong basis in evidence” from a burden of 
persuasion to a standard of proof falling below the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard. See generally id. 
 118. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 119. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (“The 
so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling 
that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional 
doubts.”).  
 120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3607 (2012). 
 121. It is likely that civil rights advocates will push for a settlement in the 
Inclusive Communities case that now sits before the Court as they did in the 
previous two cases in which the Court granted certiorari. See infra Part II.A.2–4.  
 122. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). 
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for its aggressive enforcement of the housing codes.123 The 
landlords sued under the FHA, arguing that the city’s practices 
significantly diminished the supply of affordable housing, which in 
turn disproportionately affected low-income minorities.124 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed after 
analyzing the claims under the burden-shifting approach.125 The city 
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on two 
issues: (1) whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the 
FHA; and (2) if such claims are cognizable, whether they should be 
analyzed under the burden shifting approach, under the balancing 
test, under a hybrid approach, or by some other test.126  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but never had the 
opportunity to decide the case.127 Both parties agreed to drop the 
petition after the Department of Justice and civil rights advocates 
convinced the city of St. Paul that a Supreme Court ruling on the 
case could “substantially undermine civil rights enforcement 
throughout the nation.”128 The city’s withdrawal left unanswered 
the question of whether the FHA supports disparate impact, a 
question that a small town in New Jersey gave the Court the 
chance to answer just a short time later.  
3. A Repeat Performance: Mount Holly v. Mount Holly 
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.  
The Court’s next chance to answer the disparate impact 
question arose out of the small, seemingly sedate town of Mount 
                                                                                                             
 123. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 124. Id. at 833. 
 125. Id. at 845. 
 126. Brief for the Petitioners at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012) (No. 10-1032); John W. McGee, Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holley Gardens: 
Disparate Impact and the Fair Housing Act, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 429, 447–48 
(2013). 
 127. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 636 (2013). 
 128. City of St. Paul Seeks to Dismiss United States Supreme Court Case 
Magner v. Gallagher, SAINT PAUL MINNESOTA (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.stpaul 
.gov/index.aspx?NID=4874, archived at http://perma.cc/LPL3-BCQ4. See also 
Denniston, supra note 33; Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Takes Up Challenge to 
Disparate-Impact Discrimination Theory, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 11:15 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/06/17/supreme-court-takes-up-chal 
lenge-to-disparate-impact-discrimination-theory/, archived at http://perma.cc/8NF 
4-9UAM. 
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Holly, New Jersey.129 There, the town’s only predominantly black 
and Hispanic area,130 a neighborhood known as the Gardens, was 
plagued by crime, blight, and overcrowding.131 In response, the 
neighborhood’s residents organized a number of efforts in concert 
with local authorities to improve conditions,132 but the Township grew 
tired of the cooperative approach.133 By 2002, the Township settled on 
a “destroy-and-displace” plan,134 the ultimate goal of which was to 
construct a brand new development with 520 townhomes and 
apartments.135 Because the Township’s redevelopment plan had the 
effect of displacing nearly the entirety of the Gardens’ former residents 
and eliminating the town’s only neighborhood made up primarily of 
minority inhabitants,136 the citizens of Mount Holly Gardens filed 
suit alleging a violation of the FHA under the disparate impact 
theory.137  
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim on summary 
judgment, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the lower 
court employed the wrong standard and that the plaintiffs’ 
statistical evidence sufficiently supported a prima facie case of 
                                                                                                             
 129. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 
F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. 
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013). 
 130. McGee, supra note 126, at 449.  
 131. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 378. 
 132. Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 4, Twp. of 
Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2012) (No. 
11-1507). 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 6. 
 135. Id. Of those 520 new residences, only 56 were designated to provide 
affordable housing—the cost of a new home was “well outside the range of 
affordability for a significant portion of the African-American and Hispanic 
residents of the Township.” Id. at 8. Moreover, only 11 existing garden residents 
would be offered priority status. Id. at 6.  
 136. The Gardens originally had over 300 homes and now only 70 remain 
under the private ownership of Gardens residents. Id. at 1. Additionally, even 
though the Township paid for 62 families to relocate, only 20 of them were able 
to remain in Mount Holly. Id. at 8. The looming elimination of the Gardens 
threatened to significantly diminish the town’s minority population by removing 
27.2% of African-American residents and 30.9% of Hispanic residents, thus 
drastically increasing the proportion of Caucasians in Mount Holly from 65.6% to 
75.9%. Compare id. at 3, with 2010 Census Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics for Township of Mount Holly, NJ, http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor 
/lpa/census/2010/dp/dp1_bur/mountholly1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TZ5-
4RX7 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). Demographic characteristics of the Gardens taken 
from Respondents’ Brief divided by the demographic characteristics for the town as 
a whole taken from the state website reveal the cited statistics. Id. 
 137. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 
658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. 
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013). 
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disparate impact.138 The court then remanded for further findings 
on whether the town demonstrated that no less-discriminatory 
alternatives existed.139 After the town appealed the Third Circuit’s 
ruling, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
disparate impact claims are even cognizable under the FHA, but 
declined to resolve the circuit split over the appropriate standard.140 
However, as in Magner, the parties agreed to settle their dispute 
out of court just weeks before oral argument was set to take 
place.141 The reason for the settlement, again as in Magner, was a 
push from civil rights advocates to keep the issue out of the 
Court’s hands because of the Court’s perceived opposition to the 
disparate impact theory.142 Although fair housing advocates’ 
methods for ensuring disparate impact will likely prove ineffective 
in the end, their perception that the Court will sink the disparate 
impact theory in fair housing law appears valid.143 
4. Round Three, the Potential Knockout Blow: Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. 
In a move that only reinforces the perception that disparate 
impact under the FHA is doomed, the Court has granted certiorari 
to once again consider the validity of disparate impact claims 
under the FHA in Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.144 The case arose 
when the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a nonprofit 
organization that assists “low-income, predominantly African-
                                                                                                             
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 385–86. 
 140. Wendy M. Garbers, Angela E. Kleine, & Thomas J. Noto, Supreme 
Court Takes Up Landmark Disparate Impact Case, Again, Over U.S. 
Objections, MORRISON FOERSTER (June 19, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files 
/Uploads/Images/130619-SCOTUS-Disparate-Impact.pdf, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/DLN5-3WHM.  
 141. Kaplinsky, supra note 32.  
 142. Brian J. Connolly, U.S. Supreme Court Fair Housing Case Settles, 
Disparate Impact Stays Put For Now, ROCKY MOUNTAIN REAL EST. LAW (Nov. 
14, 2013), http://www.rockymountainrealestatelaw.com/us-supreme-court-fair-
housing-act-case-settles-disparate-impact-stays-put-for-now/, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/NSX6-SSZX (“Fair housing advocates, including the Obama 
administration, have sought to prevent the FHA disparate impact issue from 
reaching the Supreme Court . . . .”). See supra Part II.A.1.  
 143. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 144. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders 
/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. 
Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371). 
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American families . . . in finding affordable housing in 
predominantly Caucasian, suburban neighborhoods” around Dallas, 
filed suit against the Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs (TDHCA).145 ICP alleged that TDHCA violated the FHA 
under both disparate treatment theory and disparate impact theory 
by distributing Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in a 
discriminatory manner.146 Specifically, “ICP alleged that [TDHCA 
was] disproportionately approving tax credit units in minority-
concentrated neighborhoods and disproportionately disapproving tax 
credit units in predominately Caucasian neighborhoods, thereby 
creating a concentration of the units in minority areas, a lack of units 
in other areas, and maintaining and perpetuating segregated housing 
patterns.”147 
The district court found that ICP failed to meet its burden of 
establishing intentional discrimination, but held that ICP 
successfully proved a violation of the FHA based on disparate 
impact.148 The defendants appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the appellate court addressed 
only whether the lower court was correct in finding a violation of 
the FHA based on disparate impact.149 Acknowledging the 
viability of disparate impact under the FHA, the Fifth Circuit 
began by explicitly adopting a three-step burden-shifting standard 
for analyzing disparate impact claims, the same standard that was 
recently adopted by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD)—the agency responsible for administering 
and enforcing the FHA.150 After adopting the burden-shifting 
approach, the court then remanded the case so that the district court 
could apply the correct legal standard.151 However, after the 
defendants appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on whether disparate impact claims are 
cognizable under the FHA; and again as in Mt. Holly, the Court 
ignored the second issue presented as to what standard should 
apply.152 
The fact that the Court granted certiorari in Mt. Holly just two 
years after losing Magner, and then granted certiorari in Inclusive 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. at 277–78.  
 146. See id. at 278–79. 
 147. Id. at 278.  
 148. See id. at 279–80. 
 149. See id. at 280.  
 150. See id. at 282. 
 151. See id. at 283.  
 152. See generally id.; Orders in Pending Cases, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Oct. 
2, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (granting certiorari in No. 13-1371). 
234 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
Communities less than a year after losing Mt. Holly, reveals its 
burning desire to address disparate impact theory under the FHA. 
However, the only major dispute between the circuit courts is the 
appropriate standard for adjudicating disparate impact cases,153 not 
whether the FHA supports disparate impact claims.154 Yet, the 
Court in Inclusive Communities and Mt. Holly declined to grant 
certiorari on that issue, instead only considering the issue of 
whether the FHA supports the theory at all.155 The Court’s decision 
to refuse review of the circuit split over the proper standard 
indicates that the Court found it unnecessary to resolve, suggesting 
that the impetus for granting certiorari was to end disparate 
impact’s run under the FHA. One could contend that such an 
outcome is not inevitable because it only takes four votes to grant 
certiorari but five to garner a majority opinion.156 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court’s recent trend of reversing the vast majority of 
cases on which it grants certiorari supports the prediction that this 
Court will strike down disparate impact under the FHA—an 
unacceptable result for those interested in guaranteeing fair 
housing for all.  
“The FHA’s purpose is to ensure fair housing for all 
individuals throughout the United States and to end discrimination 
against protected classes of persons based on prejudice, stereotypes 
or ignorance in the provision of housing.”157 If the Supreme Court 
were to read disparate impact out of the FHA, it would make 
achieving this goal next to impossible because of the difficulty of 
proving intentional discrimination.158 With disparate impact 
eliminated from the FHA, the only enforcement tool left to wronged 
individuals would be a claim of disparate treatment, which has 
                                                                                                             
 153. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 154. See supra note 28.  
 155. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders 
/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. 
Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371); Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013). See Garbers et al., supra note 140.  
 156. See Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the 
Rule of Four—or is it Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2002).  
 157. Katherine Brinson, Justifying Discrimination: How the Ninth Circuit 
Circumvented the Intent of the Fair Housing Act, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
489, 492 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968)). See also Bangerter v. Orem 
City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the purpose of the 
Fair Housing Act amendments to extend the same protections to individuals 
with disabilities). 
 158. See infra note 159. 
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limited effectiveness. As courts, scholars, and the drafters of the 
FHA have noted, “explicit discriminatory intent is exceptionally 
difficult to prove,”159 thus making disparate impact all the more 
important. Not only would such a decision put the FHA’s goals out 
of reach, but it would also contradict the intent of the FHA’s 
drafters and initial supporters in Congress.160 For instance, Senator 
Walter Mondale, the Act’s principal sponsor, stated that “it seems 
only fair, and is constitutional, that Congress should now pass a 
fair housing act to undo the effects” of past discrimination.161  
Disparate impact has significant potential as an “evidentiary 
dragnet” for holding entities and individuals involved in housing 
transactions liable when they cloak their discriminatory intent under a 
veil of legitimacy.162 Moreover, it provides a mechanism for fighting 
                                                                                                             
 159. John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and 
the Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 171 n.165 
(2002) (citing United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 783 
(N.D. Miss. 1972) (“The Court recognizes that ‘most persons will not admit 
publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice against members of the Negro 
Race.’”)); Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612 (D.N.J. 
2000) (quoting Horizon Hous. Dev. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Southhampton, 
804 F. Supp. 683, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1992)) (“[I]t is unusual that a [FHA defendant] 
will openly reveal that he or she acted on the basis of discriminatory intent.”); 
SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104, at 11 (“The FHA’s legislative history also 
demonstrates that Congress was aware of the difficulty of proving 
discriminatory intent and, because of this difficulty, allowed other forms of 
proof. Senator Baker introduced a floor amendment that would have exempted 
from liability any homeowner who engaged a real estate agent ‘without 
indicating any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race . . . , or an 
intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.’ The Baker 
amendment would have made such homeowners liable only if they intentionally 
discriminated. A number of the bill’s supporters objected that the amendment 
would undermine Congress’s purpose by making proof of discrimination 
difficult in all but the most blatant cases. The Baker amendment was defeated.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 160. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104, at 11 (“Proponents of the FHA 
emphasized that the facially neutral practices of private and public actors were a 
principal cause of residential segregation, which the Act aimed to eliminate. One 
of the Act’s leading supporters, Senator Brooke, noted that African Americans 
could not move to better neighborhoods because they were ‘surrounded by a 
pattern of discrimination based on individual prejudice, often institutionalized 
by business and industry, and Government practices.’ Senator Mondale, the 
Act’s principal sponsor, explained that after the Supreme Court had prohibited 
explicitly racial zoning laws in 1917, ‘[l]ocal ordinances with the same effect, 
although operating more deviously in an attempt to avoid the Court’s 
prohibition, were still being enacted.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 114 CONG 
REC. 2526, 2669 (1968))). 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round 
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 520 (2003) (Under the view of disparate impact 
as an evidentiary dragnet for deliberate discrimination, the “disparate impact 
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segregation by prohibiting housing practices that inadvertently have a 
disproportionate effect on minority populations and perpetuate 
residential segregation.163 An accurate understanding of the policy 
underlying the FHA and a broad reading of its language command the 
inclusion of a disparate impact cause of action.164  
B. A Call to Amend the FHA 
Notable disparate impact scholars Robert G. Schwemm and 
Sara K. Pratt have previously proposed administrative regulations 
as a means for guaranteeing disparate impact under the FHA.165 
However, HUD has since employed that approach, and its 
regulations are already being challenged in court.166 The Supreme 
Court again has the opportunity to address disparate impact under 
the FHA, and with its current ideological composition, an 
administrative regulation is unlikely to withstand the Court’s 
apparent distaste for disparate impact theory.167 Accordingly, those 
interested in guaranteeing a future for disparate impact in fair 
housing must target their efforts towards Congress and persuade it 
to codify disparate impact by amending the FHA, no matter the 
result in Inclusive Communities. Even if advocates pull this case 
away from the Court as they have in the past, Congress still must 
act because the Court appears determined to speak on this issue.  
And if the Court ends up striking down disparate impact under the 
FHA on this go-around, then Congress must respond in order to 
ensure the Act’s effectiveness is rooting out discriminatory 
practices. 
                                                                                                             
 
doctrine is a prophylactic measure that is necessary because deliberate 
discrimination can be difficult to prove.”). 
 163. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good 
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1144–45. 
 164. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 165. See generally SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104. 
 166. Deepak Gupta, Town Council to Meet on Settlement in Mount Holly 
Tonight, PUB. CITIZEN CONSUMER LAW AND POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/11/town-council-to-
meet-on-settlement-in-mount-holly-tonight.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9U 
VD-F58V (noting that a settlement would shift focus to American Insurance 
Ass’n v. HUD, where HUD’s regulation is being challenged in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia). 
 167. The Court’s recent approach towards disparate impact under the FHA 
leads to the supposition that the Court does not believe the FHA’s language 
supports disparate impact, meaning that an administrative regulation would 
likely receive no deference. See supra Part II.A.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).  
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Just as it did in response to Wards Cove in the employment 
context,168 Congress should respond to the Supreme Court by 
revising the FHA to explicitly support disparate impact claims.  
First, Congress needs to include within the FHA language that 
explicitly provides for disparate impact liability. Luckily for the 
legislature, experts in the field have already done much of the 
legwork. Schwemm and Pratt’s proposal in Disparate Impact 
Under the Fair Housing Act: A Proposed Approach includes a 
model regulation based on language in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.169 Although they intended their recommendation for use by 
HUD, the proposed language works effectively as an amendment 
to the FHA. Schwemm and Pratt’s articulation provides not only 
explicit recognition of a disparate impact cause of action but also 
relevant definitions required for its interpretation.170 By adding 
such language into the FHA, Congress can clearly establish 
                                                                                                             
 168. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.  
 169. The text of the model regulation reads as follows: 
Unjustified discriminatory impact: Prohibited actions for purposes of 
this subsection include employing any practice that has an adverse 
impact based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national 
origin, or handicap unless that practice is shown by the party 
employing it to have a legally sufficient justification. 
For purposes of this subsection: 
 –“practice” includes any practice, policy, procedure, process, 
standard, elements of practices, policies, procedures, processes, or 
standards that are not capable of being separated for analysis, and any 
other action that is intended to evaluate or affect a group of persons.  
 –“adverse impact” means a substantially different rate of selection 
which works to the disadvantage of members of a race, sex, ethnic 
group, religion, [etc.]. The term “substantially” means the same as it 
has been interpreted in prior judicial and HUD administrative 
decisions under this Act and in prior judicial decisions and 
administrative regulations under Title VII. 
 –a “legally sufficient justification” is one that (1) furthers one or more 
of the user’s legitimate, non-discriminatory interests; and (2) cannot 
be served by an alternative practice with a less discriminatory impact. 
A “legally sufficient justification” must:  
 -bear a manifest relationship to the practice that is challenged;  
 -have a significant correlation with important elements of the 
operation of the housing opportunity or business;  
 -involve a matter of substantial concern to the operation of the 
housing opportunity or business; and, be more effective in 
accomplishing its purpose than a less discriminatory alternative. 
 A “legal[ly] sufficient justification” may not: 
 -be hypothetical, speculative, or insubstantial; or 
 -be facially discriminatory or otherwise reflect an intent to discriminate 
on a prohibited basis. 
SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 104, at 28–29.  
 170. See id. 
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disparate impact under the FHA. The next question is where to 
incorporate such language into the FHA’s structure. 
Schwemm and Pratt’s proposal again provides guidance. Their 
proposed approach discusses options for the placement of disparate 
impact language within HUD’s current fair housing regulations.171 
Although HUD’s regulations differ from the FHA, Schwemm and 
Pratt’s recommendations still prove useful. One of their 
suggestions is to include the disparate impact language in “those 
parts of the regulations providing overall coverage of the FHA’s 
substantive prohibitions.”172 Accordingly, Congress can look to 
include the disparate impact provision within the substantive 
sections of the FHA that provide overall coverage, which include 
sections 3604, 3605, and 3606.173 Adding the disparate impact 
language to these sections would clearly establish that public and 
private entities engaged in housing transactions are subject to 
liability for any practice with a discriminatory effect.  
Some may contend that an amendment to the FHA is premature 
given the recent success of fair housing advocates in facilitating 
settlements. The argument goes: If advocates can push for 
settlements in Inclusive Communities and future cases, then there 
remains no risk to disparate impact under the FHA. However, such 
an approach is shortsighted. It allows the effectiveness of the FHA 
to dwindle as defendants are now keenly aware that fair housing 
advocates and the Department of Justice would rather encourage 
settlements than let the Court decide the issue.174  
This knowledge gives defendants the upper hand in 
negotiations. Defendants can effectively hold the threat of moving 
forward in litigation over plaintiffs to obtain one-sided settlement 
terms. Essentially, some defendants will be able to escape liability 
because of plaintiffs’ and amici’s fear of the Court striking down 
disparate impact. Of course, critics of this proposal can argue that 
this is the nature of litigation and settlements—the party that fears it 
will lose at the next level has less leverage in negotiations. This may 
be true, but ideally, interested parties would look to the Court for 
clarification of the law rather than fearing such pronouncements. 
Such a state of affairs undermines the purpose of the legal system—
to fairly and justly adjudicate cases and controversies—by 
permitting fear of the judiciary to dictate outcomes rather than truth, 
justice, and equity.  
                                                                                                             
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 29. 
 173. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (2012).  
 174. See Connolly, supra note 142. 
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However, disparate impact in its current form under the FHA is 
not flawless. Thus far, it has proven ineffective in eradicating 
housing discrimination.175 This Comment contends that disparate 
impact’s failures to date are not the result of any inherent 
inadequacy but rather a lack of clarity regarding its use under the 
FHA. Accordingly, when Congress amends the FHA to explicitly 
include disparate impact claims, it must also resolve the circuit 
split over the appropriate analytical standard and include a single 
standard in the amendment. That inevitably raises the question: 
What standard should Congress adopt? 
III. DISSECTING DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FHA: THE 
STANDARD DEBATE 
The disparate impact theory has proven to be a generally 
ineffective tool for FHA plaintiffs over the past forty years.176 
FHA plaintiffs asserting disparate impact claims have been 
unsuccessful in roughly 80% of the cases that reach the federal 
circuit courts.177 The fact that approximately 4,000,000 instances 
of housing discrimination occur annually,178 yet only 18 FHA 
plaintiffs (as of 2013) have succeeded on their disparate impact 
claims at the federal appellate level, demonstrates that the theory is 
failing to root out discriminatory housing practices.179  
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, a professor at Tulane University Law 
School and a frequent commentator on disparate impact under the 
FHA, suggests that one primary reason for disparate impact’s 
ineffectiveness under the FHA is that plaintiffs typically use 
disparate impact as a “Plan B” to disparate treatment claims, thus 
not fully developing an appropriate disparate impact claim.180 A 
logical explanation for plaintiffs’ misuse of the disparate impact 
theory is the lack of clarity resulting from inconsistent standards 
among the circuit courts, which other scholars have acknowledged 
as the underlying cause of the theory’s deficiencies.181 The absence 
of coherent standards for proving disparate impact liability has the 
consequence of discouraging potential plaintiffs,182 and perhaps 
                                                                                                             
 175. See supra notes 14, 20 and accompanying text.  
 176. See supra note 20. 
 177. Id.  
 178. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 20.  
 180. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good 
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1148–49; Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact 
Having Any Impact?, supra note 20, at 393. 
 181. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 182. See Peresie, supra note 21, at 774–75.  
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their lawyers as well. Moreover, it prevents public and private 
entities engaged in housing transactions from truly understanding 
their obligations under the law.183 A clear and predictable standard 
would clarify the rights and responsibilities of persons seeking 
housing and persons or entities engaged in housing transactions, 
thus reducing litigation.184 When public and private entities 
engaged in housing transactions understand their obligations, they 
will, in most cases, comply to avoid costly litigation.185 As these 
entities comply with the FHA, the number of discriminatory 
housing practices should decrease and segregation should begin to 
subside. Consequently, a clear and predictable analytical standard 
is a necessity for the effective enforcement of the FHA.  
Although Seicshnaydre contends that disparate impact’s failure 
under the FHA requires elimination of all considerations of intent 
in disparate impact,186 the more appropriate response, in light of 
the importance of disparate impact in smoking out well-disguised 
discriminatory intent,187 is to clarify the disparate impact standard 
under the FHA and explicitly define when evidence of intent can 
be relevant to disparate impact claims. Unfortunately, none of the 
standards currently employed by the circuit courts prove adequate 
in this endeavor.  
A. Examining the Current Standards Employed by the Circuit 
Courts: Pros and Cons 
Although all circuit courts that have addressed the issue agree 
that the FHA allows disparate impact claims, the circuit courts 
                                                                                                             
 183. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,480 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Brit T. Brown, Common Sense Tips for Avoiding Litigation, 
BEIRNE, MAYNARD & PARSONS, L.L.P. (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.bmpllp.com 
/publications/37-common-sense-tips-avoiding-litigation, archived at http://perma 
.cc/879V-BDDD.  
 186. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good 
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1144.  
 187. Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 1299; Primus, supra note 162, at 520. See 
also Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[C]lever men may easily conceal their motivations . . . .”); Huntington Branch, 
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Often, such 
rules bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but develop into powerful 
discriminatory mechanisms when applied.”); Rotem, supra note 21, at 1990 
(“[O]ften intent to discriminate is difficult to prove.”). 
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vary in how they analyze such claims.188 For instance, HUD and a 
number of federal courts of appeals endorse a burden-shifting 
approach similar to that used in the employment context as the 
correct standard for analyzing FHA disparate impact claims.189 
Other circuits abandon burden-shifting altogether in favor of a 
balancing test,190 while others have decided to merge the two.191 
Finally, one circuit court has utilized different tests based on 
whether the defendant is a public or private entity—using the 
burden-shifting approach for private defendants and the balancing 
test for public defendants.192 As a result, courts in different regions 
of the country can reach different outcomes on similar sets of 
facts.193 Additionally, entities engaged in housing transactions lack 
a clear guide for how to act in order to avoid litigation as they do 
not know under what circumstances they can justify housing 
procedures with a discriminatory effect.194 
1. The Burden-Shifting Approach 
The burden-shifting analysis closely mirrors the standard for 
employment discrimination outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                                                                             
 188. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 189. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2014), cert granted, http://www 
.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100214zr_086c.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/EB5B-55VL (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1371); HUD v. Twinbrook Vill. Apts., 
Nos. 02-00-0256-8, 02-00-0257-8, 02-00-0258-8, 2001 WL 1632533, at *17 (HUD 
ALJ Nov. 9, 2001); HUD v. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, Nos. 08-92-
0010-1, 08-92-0011-1, 1993 WL 367102, at *6 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 1993); 
Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939; Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 
43, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2000).  
 190. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 
1065 (4th Cir. 1982).  
 191. See, e.g., Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro 
Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2007); Mountain Side 
Mobile Estates v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 
1995).  
 192. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 1984).  
 193. See Eric W.M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to Fix 
Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1434, 1454–
57 (2012) (demonstrating how the different circuits’ standards can reach 
different results through the example of Gallagher v. Magner).  
 194. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,480 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100). 
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1991.195 Under this analysis—also known as the McDonnell-
Douglas framework196—the initial burden is on the plaintiff to 
provide statistical data demonstrating that the questioned practice 
has a disparate impact.197 If the plaintiff can do so, the burden then 
shifts to the defendant to establish a justification for the action.198 
The defendant must show that it has a legitimate reason for its 
actions and that the practices employed bear a manifest 
relationship to that legitimate interest.199 If the defendant can meet 
this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that 
reasonable, less-discriminatory alternative means are available for 
accomplishing the same goal.200  
This approach provides a clear and workable standard but fails 
from a policy standpoint. The policy concern with this formulation 
of the burden-shifting approach is the burden falling back onto the 
plaintiff after the defendant shows that it has a legitimate reason 
for its actions and that the practices employed bear a manifest 
relationship to that legitimate interest. Instead, the defendant 
should have to show that no less-discriminatory alternatives exist 
as a part of the second step of the analysis. Under this approach, 
the defendant would carry the burden of persuasion after the prima 
facie case is made.201 Indeed, some courts already use this 
formulation of the burden-shifting approach.202 In this analysis, the 
                                                                                                             
 195. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
939 (2d Cir. 1988); Bain, supra note 193, at 1469.  
 196. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 197. Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human 
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 384 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he defendant ‘must 
demonstrate that the proposed action has ‘a manifest relationship’ to the 
legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objectives . . . .’”). 
 200. Oti Kaga, 342 F.3d at 883. 
 201. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
939 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 202. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 
442, 468 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the government must show that “no 
alternative would serve the interest with less discriminatory effect”); Resident 
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146–49 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he defendant 
must show that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would 
enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact.”); Huntington 
Branch, 844 F.2d at 939 (“[A] defendant must present bona fide and legitimate 
justifications for its action with no less discriminatory alternatives available.”); 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. 
Supp. 2d 312, 322–23 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), 
cert granted, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100214zr_086c 
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EB5B-55VL. (“[D]efendants must prove two 
essential elements. First, they must prove that their interest is bona fide and 
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defendant bears the last two burdens—it must show that a 
legitimate interest justifies its actions and that less-discriminatory 
means do not exist.203  
As the Second Circuit aptly noted in Huntington Branch, 
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the three-step burden-shifting 
approach is an intent-based standard that is inapposite for disparate 
impact use.204 Unlike disparate treatment, where the plaintiff must 
overcome the defendant’s evidence of legitimate intent to prove a 
discriminatory intent, the lynchpin of disparate impact is the 
plaintiff’s proof of a disproportionate effect on members of a 
protected class.205 Plaintiffs bear this burden in the initial step, and 
everything that occurs afterwards is an attempt by the defendant to 
justify the discriminatory effect, analogous to an affirmative 
defense.206 Typically, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense 
lies with the defendant,207 and thus in disparate impact cases, the 
burden of proof for overcoming the existence of a discriminatory 
effect should also lie with the defendant. Consequently, a two-step 
approach corresponds more appropriately to disparate impact 
cases—the plaintiff provides statistical evidence of a practice’s 
discriminatory effects, and then the defendant has the opportunity to 
overcome that evidence by showing that the practice has a manifest 
relationship to a legitimate interest and that less-discriminatory 
alternatives do not exist. One scholar in particular has lauded this 
approach, noting that it is “both fair and logical” for defendants to 
“shoulder[] the burden of proving the action taken was a necessity” 
as “[t]he plaintiff has the manageable burden of proving a positive—
that the act has a disparate impact.”208 The two-step burden-shifting 
framework would provide a significant improvement; however, it 
still lacks an essential element: intent.  
                                                                                                             
 
legitimate. Second, they must prove there are no less discriminatory alternatives 
. . . .”).  
 203. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 939. 
 204. Id. (“The McDonnell Douglas test . . . is an intent-based standard for 
disparate treatment cases inapposite to the disparate impact claim asserted 
here.”).  
 205. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining that Title 
VII prohibits practices that have a disparate impact or a “disproportionately 
adverse effect on minorities”); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 
(11th Cir. 1994) (“[A] showing of a significant discriminatory effect suffices to 
demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act.”). 
 206. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).  
 207. See 9A AM. JUR. 2D Pl. & Pr. Forms Evidence § 128 (Westlaw 2014). 
 208. See Craig-Taylor, supra note 13, at 84. 
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2. The Relevance of Intent 
The essential element missing from the burden-shifting 
standard is a mechanism for dealing with cases where the 
defendant has cloaked its discriminatory intent in actions bearing a 
manifest relationship to a legitimate interest. Disparate impact 
provides a tool for smoking out such well-hidden discriminatory 
intent that cannot be addressed by a disparate treatment claim.209 
The disparate impact standard therefore needs a mechanism for 
dealing with such cases.  
Take for instance the case of Affordable Housing Development 
Corp. v. City of Fresno, where the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury’s 
denial of FHA liability when the City of Fresno declined to 
approve housing bonds for the construction of a low-income, 
multi-family apartment building known as Wellington Place,210 
which would have been the only low-income building in northwest 
Fresno and the only one outside of the inner city.211 The City 
denied the application purportedly on the grounds that the building 
would bring down local property values and that there was a lack of 
need for the project.212 Although the jury found that the City’s denial 
had a disproportionate effect on low-income minorities, it determined 
(and the court of appeals agreed) that the City’s reasons constituted a 
legitimate justification for the disproportionate effect on minorities and 
that less-discriminatory practices did not exist.213 Based on these facts 
alone, this case appears to be a straightforward, appropriate 
decision based on the City’s choice to protect its residents’ 
property values. However, plaintiffs brought forth relevant 
evidence of discriminatory intent for their disparate treatment 
claim that should not have been ignored in the disparate impact 
context.214  
Despite the Housing Authority’s initial approval of the 
application, a newly elected councilman began attempts to kill the 
project soon after taking office.215 These attempts included the 
councilman’s distribution of flyers containing inflammatory 
statements telling residents to protest “Affordable Housing . . . in 
                                                                                                             
 209. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 210. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1188–89 
(9th Cir. 2006).  
 211. Appellants A.H.D.C.’s and Ashwood Construction’s Opening Brief at 7, 
16, Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 
2006) (No. CIV-F-97-5498) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief]. 
 212. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d at 1196. 
 213. Id. at 1191–96. 
 214. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 211, at 8–15. 
 215. Id. at 9.  
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your backyard,” and his announcement that the Wellington would 
allow “low-income families with children to live near his 
constituents’ neighborhood and attend ‘their’ schools.”216 These 
efforts stirred up residents and led to residents making 
discriminatory outbursts during public meetings concerning the 
project: “We are going to end up with a lot of kids, with these large 
bedrooms at Wellington because those Hmongs217 have a lot of 
kids”; “All the Hmongs have 13 children”; and referring to one 
proponent of the project as a “spic.”218 The council thereafter cited 
community opposition as one reason for the denial.219 The jury 
determined, well within its discretion, that such evidence did not 
constitute a preponderance of the evidence necessary to find that a 
discriminatory intent motivated the project’s denial.220 However, in 
light of the substantial discriminatory effect and the evidence of 
discriminatory intent potentially motivating the City’s decision, it 
is at least plausible, and even likely, that the council’s stated 
reasons were simply a pretext for discrimination. Courts and juries 
should have the opportunity to consider such evidence within the 
framework of disparate impact. The other two standards employed 
by the circuit courts provide that opportunity.  
3. The Balancing Test 
Under the balancing test, the analysis is far less formulaic. 
Instead, courts consider four primary factors: “(1) the strength of 
plaintiffs’ showing of discriminatory impact; (2) a quantum of 
evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant’s interest in 
the challenged conduct; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks 
affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain defendants from 
interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing.”221 
The court looks at each factor and determines which party that 
factor favors.222 It then weighs the four factors together to reach its 
conclusion as to whether the practice violates the FHA.223 This 
                                                                                                             
 216. Id. at 9–10 (alterations omitted). 
 217. The United States Census Bureau counts persons identifying themselves 
as “Hmongs” as being of the “Asian” race. Id. at 13 n.7. 
 218. Id. (alterations omitted). 
 219. See id. at 10. The influx of new children and community opposition 
were the reasons the City killed the Wellington project. Id. 
 220. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1191 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 221. Bain, supra note 193, at 1446 n.83 (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. 
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 222. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290–93 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 223. Id. at 1293–94.  
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approach gives judges the ability to address signs of discriminatory 
pretext if necessary, but it falters by allowing for too much 
subjectivity because the courts have received little guidance as to 
how much weight each factor should receive.224  
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in Langlois 
v. Abington Housing Authority, this approach allows individual 
judges to make significant policy choices by deciding which 
criteria are more important or worthy.225 For this reason, uniform 
interpretation of the FHA and consistent analyses of FHA disparate 
impact claims would prove nearly impossible under a balancing 
test as different judges would emphasize different factors. 
Furthermore, inconsistent analyses of disparate impact claims 
undermine one of the primary goals of implementing a single 
standard: making those involved in housing transactions aware of 
their rights and obligations.226  
Moreover, as the court in Langlois correctly pointed out, 
having federal judges decide such policy issues is “to impose on 
them the job of making decisions that are properly made by 
Congress or its executive-branch delegates.”227 If Congress were to 
endorse a balancing test, it would reflect its inability and 
unwillingness to do its job, instead handing that task over to the 
judiciary, which, although not unprecedented, proves undesirable 
because the judiciary has already shown a distaste for disparate 
impact.228 Finally, “the balancing approach is in tension with the 
course taken by the Supreme Court and Congress under Title VII 
where a standard of justification is constructed and applied.”229 
Courts considering disparate impact claims under the FHA need 
not, and should not, treat them identically to those under Title VII, 
but they should treat them similarly.230  
                                                                                                             
 224. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000).  
 225. Id.  
 226. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.  
 227. Langlois, 207 F.3d at 51. 
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 229. Langlois, 207 F.3d at 51. 
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4. The Hybrid Approach 
The hybrid approach combines aspects of both the burden-
shifting approach and the balancing test.231 The first two steps in 
the hybrid method reflect the burden-shifting approach, while the 
final step borrows from the balancing test.232 First, a plaintiff must 
make out a prima facie case by presenting evidence that the 
questioned practice has a disparate impact.233 Thereafter, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate interest 
and show that no alternative practices could accomplish the same 
end.234 The court then balances two other factors to determine 
whether actionable discrimination has occurred.235 The first factor 
that courts consider is whether the plaintiff has any evidence of 
discriminatory intent.236 Next, the court considers the form of relief 
the plaintiff seeks to determine whether public policy implications 
may weigh against siding in the plaintiff’s favor.237 The court then 
weighs the last two considerations in light of the evidence 
presented by both parties in the balancing phase to reach its 
ultimate conclusion.238  
This mechanism for assessing disparate impact claims provides 
the best and most effective standard of the three primary standards 
employed by the courts of appeals for two reasons. First, it 
provides a structured and objective method in the form of a two-
step burden-shifting test. Secondly, it provides a means for courts 
to consider evidence of intent to determine whether a facially 
neutral practice is simply a pretext for discrimination. However, 
the hybrid test still has faults. 
The main problem with this test is that some courts seem to 
mandate evidence of intent to support a claim of disparate 
impact,239 which is at odds with the fundamental nature of the 
                                                                                                             
 231. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
936 (2d Cir. 1988).  
 232. See supra Parts III.A.1, 3. 
 233. Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 936. 
 234. Id. 
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 239. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good 
Intentions?, supra note 17, at 1153 n.64 (citing Strykers Bay Neighborhood 
Council v. City of New York, 695 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
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disparate impact theory.240 Although the standard must retain the 
flexibility to allow for evidence of intent or pretext in those cases 
where facially neutral practices simply provide a well-designed 
cover for discriminatory intent (such as in Affordable Housing 
Development Corp. v. City of Fresno),241 a disparate impact 
standard should not demand evidence of intent. The primary 
purpose of the disparate impact theory is to prevent discrimination 
based on facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects, 
which by definition can survive without proof of a discriminatory 
intent. A standard that requires evidence of intent renders disparate 
impact meaningless by equating it with disparate treatment.  
Additionally, as part of the hybrid test, courts consider the form 
of relief requested by the plaintiffs in making their judgment as to 
whether a violation of the FHA occurred.242 The form of relief 
sought by plaintiffs, though, has no bearing on whether 
discrimination has occurred. If a court finds that a defendant lacks 
a viable justification for its actions, that court should not have the 
ability to reverse course and find in favor of the defendant simply 
because it does not want to force the defendant to take a certain 
action.243 Including this element in the standard simply provides an 
excuse for courts to ignore discriminatory actions.  
Proponents of this fourth element argue that courts should 
“move reluctantly and cautiously” when considering whether to 
compel a defendant to undertake “affirmative, involuntary 
action.”244 Although forcing municipalities or private entities to 
take affirmative steps may seem extreme, in certain instances 
action is required to reverse the effects of discriminatory practices. 
Some may fear that allowing such judicial action will subject every 
town or city to liability if it refuses to provide mixed-income 
housing or similar developments. However, the legislature can 
assuage such fears by providing a clear definition of the 
“practices” that plaintiffs may challenge.245 A positive definition of 
the term will prevent plaintiffs from subjecting entities to liability 
                                                                                                             
 240. See supra Part I.B.  
 241. Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 242. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.  
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2014] COMMENT 249 
 
 
 
for a lack of decision-making, thus shielding entities not actively 
engaged in discriminatory policy-making. Consequently, an 
element relating to the type of relief sought is not required in an 
effective disparate impact standard.  
B. Proposing a Proper Standard: The Modified Burden-Shifting 
Approach 
The best disparate impact standard would be similar to the 
hybrid approach but without the fourth factor that considers the 
form of relief sought by the plaintiff. This “modified burden-
shifting approach” takes the two-step form of the burden-shifting test 
and modifies it by adding a final pretext consideration, if necessary, in 
which the plaintiff can introduce evidence of intent that, although 
insufficient to meet the disparate treatment preponderance of the 
evidence standard,246 indicates a potential ulterior motive on the part 
of the defendant. 
In the first step, the plaintiff must make a prima facie statistical 
showing that the challenged practice has a disparate impact on a 
protected class. If the plaintiff can meet that burden, then the defendant 
must show that the practice is necessary—i.e., that there are no less-
discriminatory alternatives—to achieve a legitimate interest. If the 
defendant fails to meet that burden, the practice is a violation of the 
FHA. However, if the defendant can meet that burden, the practice 
will not violate the FHA unless the plaintiff has sufficient evidence 
of discriminatory intent. In order to prevail at this third step, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate through a “strong basis in evidence” 
that the facially neutral practice is in actuality motivated by 
discriminatory intent. The “strong basis in evidence” standard is 
best for this inquiry because the Court has already endorsed its use 
with disparate impact,247 and it provides a more lenient standard 
than “preponderance of the evidence” while also requiring that 
plaintiffs have a legitimate, meaningful standard to attain so that 
just any bare-bones evidence will not suffice.248 A strong basis in 
evidence that the defendant acted intentionally, in conjunction with 
significant discriminatory effects, should render a practice 
unlawful.  
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This standard for analyzing FHA disparate impact claims rises 
above those standards currently employed by the circuit courts for 
three main reasons: (1) its objective burden-shifting foundation 
employs an equitable two-step, rather than three-step, formulation 
that requires the defendant to show that less-discriminatory 
alternatives do not exist; (2) it provides a third pretext element that 
allows, but does not require, plaintiffs to argue that a defendant’s 
facially neutral practice is simply a pretext for intentional 
discrimination; and (3) it does not include any arbitrary, irrelevant 
factors such as the type of relief that the plaintiff requests. In 
practice, the modified burden-shifting standard will allow courts to 
address the two types of discrimination that disparate impact has 
traditionally tried to address: facially neutral practices with 
inadvertent discriminatory effects and facially neutral practices 
with discriminatory effects that are a result of well-hidden 
discriminatory intent that falls outside the reach of a disparate 
treatment claim.249 
Consider again Affordable Housing Development Corp. v. City 
of Fresno.250 The first step of the modified burden-shifting 
standard would apply identically to that of the burden-shifting 
standard used by the court in City of Fresno.251 The plaintiffs 
would have to provide statistical evidence that the City’s practice 
had a significant disproportionate effect on a protected class. In 
City of Fresno, the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated that the 
City’s decision to deny funding had a discriminatory effect.252 If 
the plaintiffs meet their burden, the burden would then shift to the 
defendant. Under the modified burden-shifting framework, the 
defendant must show that its practice had a manifest relationship to 
a legitimate interest and that no other less-discriminatory 
alternatives existed. In City of Fresno, the defendant met that 
burden.  
The City showed legitimate reasons for denying funding for the 
project: the impact of a large rental unit on neighboring property 
values and an arguable lack of need for the project.253 The City’s 
decision displayed an obvious relationship to the legitimate 
interest—it denied funding so as not to have an unneeded 
apartment building constructed in an area where it would bring 
down neighboring property values.254 Finally, because it was a 
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2014] COMMENT 251 
 
 
 
simple up-and-down vote, there were no alternative decisions the 
City could have made regarding funding to achieve the same 
end.255 Therefore, the City would meet its burden at the second 
step of the modified-burden shifting approach. In most cases, this 
would signal the end of the inquiry because although the plaintiff 
identified a discriminatory effect resulting from the facially neutral 
practice, the defendant presented a justifiable defense. As the 
Ninth Circuit noted in City of Fresno, “[a] governmental interest in 
not giving approval may outweigh the desirability of furnishing 
low-rent housing.”256 This formulation allows entities engaged in 
housing transactions to further legitimate interests despite the 
existence of a disparate impact. The practice with a discriminatory 
effect will be permitted as long as: (1) the entity is not covering for 
discriminatory motives; and (2) it has done its due diligence on the 
front end (in other words, it has determined that less-
discriminatory alternatives do not exist).  
However, the modified burden-shifting standard also has the 
flexibility to assist plaintiffs possessing some evidence of 
discriminatory intent that may not reach the preponderance of the 
evidence level required for success in disparate treatment claims. In 
the optional third step of this proposed standard, the plaintiff would 
have the opportunity to bring forth evidence of discriminatory intent 
that may have motivated the defendant’s adoption of the facially 
neutral policy. Under this analysis, the trier of fact should determine 
whether the evidence provides a “strong basis” for believing that the 
defendant acted intentionally. A strong basis in evidence that the 
defendant acted intentionally, in conjunction with significant 
discriminatory effects, should render a practice unlawful.  
In City of Fresno, the plaintiffs could have introduced their 
evidence of intent under this third step and made it relevant to the 
disparate impact determination. The City of Fresno appellant’s 
brief reveals significant evidence showing that the community’s 
negativity towards the housing development was largely race-
based.257 Moreover, it demonstrates that one of the City’s reasons 
for denying funding was the community opposition.258 Not only 
does this establish that the City rejected the proposal at least partly 
in response to the community’s discriminatory motivations, but it 
also undercuts the “legitimate” interest argued at trial. Moreover, the 
City had a policy of confining all low-income housing to its inner 
city, which not only perpetuates segregation but also indicates a 
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similar history of discriminatory motives.259 Accordingly, a trier of 
fact could—and should—find a strong basis in evidence for the 
proposition that discriminatory intent motivated the City’s decision. 
The modified burden-shifting approach allows such evidence to 
influence the outcome of disparate impact cases and hold entities 
liable for discriminatory motives. This standard protects against 
local governments’ discriminatory practices as described above, 
and it also protects against the discriminatory practices of real 
estate agents and financial institutions. Those entities often 
perpetuate segregation by implementing facially neutral policies 
that are simply a pretext for discrimination, such as racial 
steering.260  
Lending discrimination is a persistent problem, and lenders 
have maneuvered around anti-discrimination laws by carefully 
implementing race-neutral criteria that allow them to continue their 
discriminatory lending patterns.261 For example, lenders can use 
facially neutral criteria that have a known discriminatory effect to 
deny loans to minorities seeking housing in traditionally white 
neighborhoods.262 Or, as described in the example above where the 
lending institution denied loans on all homes under $100,000, 
lenders can find race-neutral criteria for denying loans to 
minorities on a much wider scale.263 A Title VII-like burden-
shifting framework would often permit such action because of the 
facially neutral practice tailored toward the legitimate interest of 
only handing out profitable loans. However, the modified burden-
shifting test would allow plaintiffs in the final pretext step to 
present evidence that the lender has simply found a roundabout 
way to discriminate based on race. By maintaining the capacity to 
punish well-designed pretexts, and by allowing for fair and 
effective adjudication of disparate impact claims even when intent 
plays no role, the modified burden-shifting approach rises above 
the standards currently employed by the circuit courts. 
Based on this Comment’s extensive comparison of the FHA to 
Title VII, one could believe that the legislature, if it does act, 
should implement an FHA standard identical to that used in Title 
VII claims. Nevertheless, several factors weigh against an identical 
                                                                                                             
 259. Id. at 16.  
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standard. Courts considering disparate impact claims under the 
FHA should treat them similarly, not identically.264 
The first factor weighing against an identical standard is that 
the defendant, rather than the plaintiff (as in Title VII), should 
have to show that no less-discriminatory alternatives exist as a part 
of the second step of the analysis.265 Second, the disparate impact 
standard for FHA cases must differ from Title VII by including the 
option of a third step for considering pretext because data indicates 
that segregation in the workplace has begun to decrease,266 while 
residential segregation remains pervasive.267  
“The U.S. workforce is undoubtedly becoming more diverse,”268 
and thus concerns over employers disguising discriminatory 
motivations in facially neutral employment practices, although not 
completely gone, should decrease. Studies have contended that this 
increase in workplace diversity can contribute to employers becoming 
more “cognizant of potentially racially biased behavior,”269 thus 
signaling that employment discrimination should continue to 
decrease. On the other hand, the prevalence of residential 
segregation signifies, and data supports the conclusion, that 
discriminatory housing practices continue to occur regularly.270 
The third step of the modified burden-shifting approach is 
designed to address such situations—among others—as those 
where financial institutions purport to base loan decisions on race-
neutral profitability data but in actuality manipulate factors in 
determining creditworthiness to maintain the status quo of 
segregated neighborhoods. The pervasiveness of residential 
segregation and the smarmy tactics used by entities engaged in 
housing transactions commands that the FHA standard deviate 
from the Title VII standard.  
Lest one accept the contention that disparate impact under the 
FHA should differ from that of Title VII yet insist that the 
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modified burden-shifting standard simply strays too far, it should 
be noted that inclusion of a pretext element in disparate impact 
claims is well-established in multiple jurisdictions. Two of the 
standards currently employed by the courts of appeals, the 
balancing test and the hybrid approach, utilize such a 
component.271 Furthermore, under Canadian law, courts use a 
single, uniform standard for analyzing employment discrimination 
claims, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges disparate 
treatment or disparate impact.272 The standard contains a good faith 
element, thus allowing Canadian courts to consider evidence of 
intent when evaluating disparate impact claims.273 Accordingly, 
this is an element that many jurisdictions, as well as scholars,274 
consider useful in evaluating a defendant’s justification. 
Additionally, as noted above, scholars and courts also support the 
use of a two-step burden-shifting foundation for the disparate 
impact standard.275 Hence, codification of the modified burden-
shifting standard would not be a drastic departure from how some 
courts currently handle FHA disparate impact cases, and it proves 
a far better fit than the standard used under Title VII. This standard 
allows courts the flexibility to consider evidence of intent, when 
necessary, to flush out those practices that appear neutral but truly 
cover for an actor’s discriminatory motive.  
C. Codification: Incorporation of the Modified Burden-Shifting 
Approach Into an FHA Amendment  
With respect to the inclusion of the modified burden-shifting 
standard in an FHA amendment, the legislature should look to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 for guidance because the Act provides a 
good starting point in terms of structure.276 The proposed 
amendment, included in Appendix A, would mesh the disparate 
impact language provided by Schwemm and Pratt277 with language 
supporting the modified burden-shifting standard and incorporate it 
into the structure supplied by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.278 The 
most significant change, outside of replacing employment law 
language with fair housing language, comes in part (1)(A) where 
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the modified burden-shifting standard, in clear and concise terms, 
explains how courts should analyze—and allocate the burden of 
proof in—FHA disparate impact cases.279 The ambiguous and 
confusing language used to explain the standard for employment 
cases is eliminated to include the following standard for FHA cases: 
Burden of proof in discriminatory impact cases: 
 
(1) (A) An unlawful housing practice based on disparate 
impact is established under this subchapter if— 
 
     (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a 
respondent uses a particular housing practice 
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, 
national origin, or handicap; and 
 
     (ii) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice has a legally sufficient 
justification;280 or 
 
     (iii) the complaining party introduces enough 
evidence of discriminatory intent to form a 
strong basis that respondent’s legally sufficient 
justification is a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination.  
This amendment to the FHA will provide clear support for the 
use of the disparate impact theory under the FHA, while also 
supplying courts with a clear and uniform standard for the equitable 
adjudication of FHA disparate impact claims. Residential 
segregation has persisted for too long, and with the Supreme Court 
poised to put an end to disparate impact under the FHA, Congress 
must respond by codifying the theory and the modified burden-
shifting approach within the Fair Housing Act. 
CONCLUSION 
“It is all about ‘here’ . . . that is the way we have to think about 
social issues.”281 Minnijean Brown-Trickey, one of the “Little 
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Rock Nine” who helped to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High 
School in 1957, conveyed this message on January 17, 2014, while 
speaking at an event honoring the birthday of Reverend Martin 
Luther King, Jr.282 Her words aptly fit the situation confronting this 
country with regards to its housing patterns. As the 2010 Census 
data maps indicate, residential segregation remains pervasive in 
this country.283 The only change likely to come is the Supreme 
Court’s elimination of disparate impact claims under the FHA in 
Inclusive Communities,284 which will only serve to reinforce the 
status quo of segregation by removing a major tool needed for 
purging the epidemic. Doomsday is looming with Inclusive 
Communities sitting before the Justices, and Congress cannot allow 
a crushing blow from the Court or another shortsighted settlement 
to continue to emasculate the FHA—an amendment to the FHA is 
a must no matter the outcome. 
This Comment’s proposed amendment will not only guarantee 
the disparate impact cause of action for plaintiffs, but it will also 
clarify and improve the effectiveness of the law by implementing a 
modified burden-shifting standard for analyzing disparate impact 
claims under the FHA. The modified burden-shifting standard has 
the capacity to address facially neutral practices with a 
discriminatory effect, whether that effect is inadvertent, or whether 
the actor intended it and used the facially neutral practice as a 
pretext for his or her discriminatory motive. It also provides an 
objective framework closely correlated to the FHA’s underlying 
purpose of ensuring fair housing for all.285 If Congress is finally 
willing to stand behind its rhetoric and put an end to residential 
segregation, the first step in that direction is to codify disparate 
impact and the modified burden-shifting standard. The opportunity 
is here, and the time is now.  
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APPENDIX A 
Proposed Amendment to the Fair Housing Act Including Disparate 
Impact Language and the Modified Burden Shifting Standard286 
Unjustified discriminatory impact: Prohibited actions for purposes 
of this subsection include: 
(1) employing any practice that has an adverse impact based on 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or 
handicap unless that practice is shown by the party employing 
it to have a legally sufficient justification. 
 
Burden of proof in discriminatory impact cases: 
(1) (A) An unlawful housing practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this subchapter if— 
  (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent 
uses a particular housing practice that has an adverse 
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, national origin, or handicap; and 
  (ii) the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged 
practice has a legally sufficient justification; or 
  (iii) the complaining party introduces enough evidence of 
discriminatory intent to form a strong basis that 
respondent’s legally sufficient justification is a pretext 
for unlawful discrimination. 
 (B) (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular housing 
practice causes a disparate impact as described in 
subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall 
demonstrate that each particular challenged housing 
practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the 
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the 
elements of a respondent's decision making process are 
not capable of separation for analysis, the decision 
making process may be analyzed as one housing 
practice. 
  (ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific housing 
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the 
respondent shall not be required to meet its burden 
outlined in subparagraph (A)(ii). 
                                                                                                             
 286. The structure and much of the language used for this sample statute is 
borrowed from that used in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the work of Robert 
G. Schwemm and Sara K. Pratt in Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing 
Act: A Proposed Approach. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012); SCHWEMM & 
PRATT, supra note 104, at 28–29. 
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(2)  A demonstration that a housing practice is required as the 
necessary means to a legitimate business or governmental 
interest may not be used as a defense against a claim of 
intentional discrimination under this subchapter. 
 
For purposes of this subsection: 
(1) “practice” includes any practice, policy, procedure, process, 
standard, elements of practices, policies, procedures, processes, 
or standards that are not capable of being separated for 
analysis, and any other action that is intended to evaluate or 
affect a group of persons.  
(2) “adverse impact” means a substantially different rate of 
selection which works to the disadvantage of members of a race, 
sex, ethnic group, religion, [etc.]. The term “substantially” 
means the same as it has been interpreted in prior judicial and 
HUD administrative decisions under this Act and in prior 
judicial decisions and administrative regulations under Title VII. 
(3)  A “legally sufficient justification” is one that: 
 (A) furthers one or more of the user’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory interests; and  
 (B) cannot be served by an alternative practice with a less 
discriminatory impact.  
(4) A “legally sufficient justification” must:  
 (A) bear a manifest relationship to the practice that is challenged; 
and 
 (B) have a significant correlation with important elements of 
the operation of the housing opportunity or business; and 
(C) involve a matter of substantial concern to the operation of 
the housing opportunity or business; and, be more effective 
in accomplishing its purpose than any less discriminatory 
alternative. 
(5) A “legally sufficient justification” may not be hypothetical, 
speculative, or insubstantial. 
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